Abstract: I document differences in interest rate expectations between central banks and the private sector. I then show why such a gap is a puzzle and offer several possible explanations for its existence. In particular, I find that at least some of this gap must be attributed to differences in beliefs about the central bank's reaction function. I also consider the macroeconomic implications of such a gap. First, I create a measure of central bank credibility by taking the absolute value of the difference in expectations. Then, I use this measure of credibility in an event study across several countries to demonstrate that a decrease in credibility can reduce the efficacy of forward guidance. In fact, I find that a gap of around 100 basis points can almost completely dampen the impact of the Federal Reserve's forward guidance.
Keywords: Credibility, Forward Guidance, Central Bank Projections, Market Expectations, Asset PricesJEL Codes: E52, E58, E44
Abstract: I examine whether vacancies on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve are costly. I find little evidence to suggest that this is the case: monetary policy, the level of uncertainty regarding the future path of monetary policy, and the Board of Governor's supervisory and communication responsibilities are largely unaffected by the number of absences on the committee. I show that this low cost has important implications for the nomination process from both the perspective of the president and the Senate.
Keywords: FOMC, Vacancies, Board of Governors, NominationsJEL Codes: E58, E52, D72
Abstract: This paper examines the trading behavior of members of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). We calculate the financial market returns of FOMC members relative to the overall market and examine if there is any evidence of abnormal returns. We also test whether FOMC members exhibit evidence of market timing around FOMC meeting dates. In both cases, we find no evidence of abnormal returns.
Keywords: FOMC, Abnormal Returns, Investment Behavior of Elected OfficialsJEL Codes: E58, G14, D72
Works in Progress
Policy Rule by Committee
Sectoral Heterogeneity in Interest Rate Expectations