Abstract: I document differences in interest rate expectations between central banks and the private sector. I then show why such a gap is a puzzle and offer several possible explanations for its existence. In particular, I find that at least some of this gap must be attributed to differences in beliefs about the central bank's reaction function. I also consider the macroeconomic implications of such a gap. First, I create a measure of central bank credibility by taking the absolute value of the difference in expectations. Then, I use this measure of credibility in an event study across several countries to demonstrate that a decrease in credibility can reduce the efficacy of forward guidance. In fact, I find that a gap of around 100 basis points can almost completely dampen the impact of the Federal Reserve's forward guidance.

Abstract: This paper examines partisanship in public perceptions of the Federal Reserve. In all years from 2001 through 2023, trust in the Federal Reserve was highest for respondents of the same party as the President. The partisan effects were larger than other demographic differences in trust, but do not explain the large partisan gap in inflation expectations in those years. We conducted a new survey-based information experiment before and after the Presidential inauguration in 2025, and found a changed pattern: Republicans continued to have lower trust in the Fed than did Democrats, even after a Republican President was elected and took office. Yet, Republicans had much lower inflation expectations than Democrats. Responses to open-ended survey questions point to tariffs and President Trump himself as most salient to consumers when considering how inflation will evolve.

Abstract: This paper examines the trading behavior of members of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). First, we calculate the financial market returns of FOMC members relative to the overall market and examine if there is any evidence of abnormal returns. Second, we test whether FOMC members exhibit evidence of market timing around monetary policy announcements. We do not find any evidence that FOMC officials select securities that earn abnormal returns. However, our results regarding market timing are mixed. Though we do not find any evidence of security selection or portfolio rebalancing with respect to monetary policy decisions, we do find that stock sales by FOMC officials are typically succeeded by negative returns in the overall stock market. 

Abstract: I examine whether vacancies on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve are costly. I find little evidence to suggest that this is the case: monetary policy, the level of uncertainty regarding the future path of monetary policy, and the Board of Governor's supervisory and communication responsibilities are largely unaffected by the number of absences on the committee. I show that this low cost has important implications for the nomination process from both the perspective of the president and the Senate.

Abstract: We provide evidence that monetary policy committees do not necessarily follow the policy preferences of their individual members when there is uncertainty about state variables. Further, using data from the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), we show that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) as a whole was forecasting a much stronger response to unemployment than the individual members of the committee. This difference between the preferences of committee members and the policy decision of the committee provides a mechanism for central bank communication to negatively impact interest rate forecast accuracy.